Deporting Legal Aliens Convicted of Drunk Driving: Analyzing the Classification of Drunk Driving as a  Crime of Violence by Kiehl, Stacia A.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 86
Issue 4 Spring 2003 Article 5
Deporting Legal Aliens Convicted of Drunk
Driving: Analyzing the Classification of Drunk
Driving as a "Crime of Violence"
Stacia A. Kiehl
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Stacia A. Kiehl, Deporting Legal Aliens Convicted of Drunk Driving: Analyzing the Classification of Drunk Driving as a "Crime of Violence",
86 Marq. L. Rev. 797 (2003).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol86/iss4/5
DEPORTING LEGAL ALIENS CONVICTED OF
DRUNK DRIVING: ANALYZING THE
CLASSIFICATION OF DRUNK DRIVING AS A
"CRIME OF VIOLENCE"
I. INTRODUCTION
Current immigration law provides for the deportation of "[a]ny alien
who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission."'
In 1996, with the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA)2 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),3 Congress drastically altered
the legal landscape with respect to aggravated felonies . In addition to
expanding the number and types of crimes that are classified as
aggravated felonies,5 the 1996 laws subject aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies to mandatory deportation. As a result of this
legislation, there has been a substantial increase in the likelihood of a
lawful, permanent resident being deported following a criminal
conviction! Furthermore, deportation for an aggravated felony "applies
regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after
[the date of enactment]."' Not surprisingly, this retroactive application
has resulted in profound consequences and has received substantial
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). Section 1227 details numerous classes of aliens
that are deportable including, but not limited to, aliens convicted of aggravated felonies or
crimes of moral turpitude; aliens who are, or were anytime after admission, drug abusers or
addicts; and aliens convicted of domestic violence crimes. § 1227(a).
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified in various titles of the United States Code, including Titles 8 and 18)..
3. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in various sections of Titles 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
4. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws
and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000)
(discussing the impact that the 1996 Acts have on aliens with criminal convictions).
5. See Brent K. Newcomb, Comment, Immigration Law and the Criminal Alien: A
Comparison of Policies for Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent Residents Convicted of
Aggravated Felonies, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 697, 700 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97,113 (1998); Morawetz, supra note 4, at 1936.
7. See Morawetz, supra note 4, at 1939; Morawetz, supra note 6, at 107.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000).
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criticism.9
In recent years, the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) has initiated deportation proceedings against legal aliens
with drunk driving convictions under the premise that such offenses are
aggravated felonies.'" A number of aliens who were issued deportation
orders resulting from drunk driving convictions have appealed, leading
to a federal circuit court split." The United States Courts of Appeals for
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held that drunk driving qualifies
as an "aggravated felony" for deportation purposes, while the Second,
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that it does not.2
While those aliens who commit serious crimes must be deported in
order to protect the citizens of this country, deportation based upon
drunk driving convictions is a disproportionate measure. 3 Deportation
is a serious consequence, not only for the individual deported, but also
for that individual's family. The United States Supreme Court considers
deportation "a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile."'4 Considering the consequences of deportation,
the government must consider whether drunk driving warrants such
extreme action. While drunk driving is a serious problem in the United
States, other possible punishments, such as imprisonment, fines, license
revocation, and community service, are more proportional to the
offense than deportation.
"[T]he issue of whether felony DWI [(Driving While Intoxicated)] is
a crime of violence is one 'affecting hundreds if not thousands of
9. See, e.g., Paige Krasker, Note, Crimes of the Past Revisited: Legal Aliens Deported for
Past Crimes Under the Retroactive Application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 109 (1998); Bruce R. Marley, Comment,
Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive Application of Aggravated
Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 855 (1998); Anjali
Parekh Prakash, Note, Changing the Rules: Arguing Against Retroactive Application of
Deportation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001); Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237
F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); Juan Olivares-Martinez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 148 (B.I.A. 2001).
11. See infra Part III.A-B.
12. Id.
13. But see Julie Anne Rah, Note, The Removal of Aliens Who Drink and Drive: Felony
DWI as a Crime of Violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2109, 2148 (2002)
(arguing that "[flelony DWI is a sufficiently violent and dangerous offense to warrant
removal as a crime of violence.").
14. Fong Haw Tanan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael,
332 U.S. 388 (1947)).
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aliens. '""5  Given the importance of this issue, the serious nature of
deportation, and the federal circuit court split, the Supreme Court may
ultimately need to determine whether drunk driving qualifies as an
aggravated felony under federal law, thus subjecting non-citizens to
deportation. 6 If the Court is presented with this question, it should hold
that drunk driving is not a deportable offense, based on both statutory
analysis and social policy concerns.
Part II of this Comment will discuss immigration statutes with
respect to deportation, and their application in recent years. Part III of
this Comment will discuss and compare the cases arising out of the
federal circuits that have established the circuit split regarding whether
drunk driving qualifies as an aggravated felony. Part IV of this
Comment will analyze these cases, concluding that a drunk driving
conviction should not be considered an aggravated felony for purposes
of deportation under current immigration law. Additionally, Part IV
will discuss the social policy reasons supporting the conclusion that
aliens should not be deported on the basis of drunk driving convictions.
II. OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION OF DEPORTATION STATUTES
The United States Code details the offenses for which an alien may
be deported. 7 One such provision states that an alien is deportable if he
or she "is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission"
into the United States." An aggravated felony is defined as "a crime of
violence ... for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year," 9
among other specifically enumerated crimes.0 The Code further
provides that a crime of violence is:
15. Rah, supra note 13, at 2111 (quoting United States v. Chapa-Garza, 262 F.3d 479,
480 (5th Cir. 2001) (Barksdale, J., dissenting)).
16. See Patricia Mason, DUI Crash Not 'Violent Crime': Appeals Court, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., July 6, 2001, at 1.
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000).
18. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2000).
20. See § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) for a list of the specific crimes deemed to be aggravated
felonies that expose an alien to deportation if convicted. For example, murder, rape, and
sexual abuse of a minor are all categorized as aggravated felonies. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
Additionally, theft and burglary offenses with terms of imprisonment of one year or more are
considered aggravated felonies. § 1101(a)(43)(G). In addition, "an attempt or conspiracy to
commit" any offense, including a crime of violence, under § 1101(a)(43) qualifies as a
deportable aggravated felony. § 1101(a)(43)(U).
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(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person
or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.2
When determining whether a crime constitutes an aggravated felony,
courts do not look to the defendant's actual conduct, but rather consider
whether the particular statute under which he or she was convicted
embodies conduct that constitutes an aggravated felony.22 When
applying this categorical approach, "'the singular circumstances of an
individual petitioner's crimes should not be considered, and only the
minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a
given statute is relevant.' "" Either physical force must be an element of
the offense or "the nature of the crime-as evidenced by the generic
elements of the offense-must be such that its commission ordinarily
would present a risk that physical force would be used against the
person or property of another, irrespective of whether the risk develops
or harm actually occurs.24
Applying these statutes in contexts other than drunk driving
provides helpful background information and demonstrates that
deportation based upon a drunk driving conviction is disproportionate
to the severity of the crime. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter under
California law constitutes a crime of violence and is thus an aggravated
felony.25 Applying the categorical approach, the court stated that 18
21. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
22. E.g., Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2001); Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018,
1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir.
2000)); Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2001); Rah, supra note 13, at
2122. This approach is employed due to the "by its nature" language used in section 16(b).
Id.
23. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 204 (quoting Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 270 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Calabresi, J., dissenting)).
24. Gonzalo Palacios-Palacios, No. A90-284-849, 1998 BIA LEXIS 44, at *4-5 (Dec. 18,
1998), 22 I. & N. Dec. 434 (B.I.A. 1998).
25. Park, 252 F.3d at 1021. Eun Kyung Park was convicted of involuntary manslaughter
under California Penal Code Section 192(b) for her participation in the death of a young
woman who was beaten during a religious ceremony conducted to exorcize demons. Id. at
1020. Park was sentenced to three years in state prison. Id.
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U.S.C. § 16(a) would "not apply because the 'use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force' is not an element of involuntary
manslaughter."26 However, following a previous Ninth Circuit decision
under a different, but almost identical statute, the court held that
involuntary manslaughter is a crime of violence under § 16(b) because
the offense, by its nature, involves physical force against a person.27 In
making this determination, the court rejected the contention that §
16(b) "requires a substantial risk that physical force may be used
intentionally in the course of committing the offense." Instead, the
court held that it suffices to have a reckless mens rea to satisfy either §
16(a) or § 16(b).29
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Gonzalo Palacios-
Pinera determined that a conviction for first-degree arson under the
laws of Alaska qualifies as a crime of violence, and is therefore a
deportable offense.0 The arson statute under which Palacios-Pinera was
convicted states in pertinent part that "[a] person commits the crime of
arson in the first degree if the person intentionally damages any
property by starting a fire or causing an explosion and by that act
recklessly places another person in danger of serious physical injury."31
The BIA held that this act of arson, by its very nature, presents a
substantial risk of physical force against another's person or property,
and thus is a crime of violence under § 16(b).32
However, in Francis v. Reno,33 the Third Circuit held that a
misdemeanor conviction for vehicular homicide in Pennsylvania was not
a crime of violence.34 Robert Francis, a Jamaican citizen and a legal
26. Id. at 1022 n.4 (quoting United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th Cir.
1987)).
27. See id. at 1021-22.
28. Id. at 1023 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 1024.
30. See Gonzalo Palacios-Palacios, No. A9-284-849, 1998 BIA LEXIS 44 (Dec. 18, 1998),
22 I. & N. Dec. 434 (B.I.A. 1998). Gonzalo Palacios-Pinera was sentenced to seven years in
prison with three years of his sentence suspended. Id. at *1. Aliens that are determined to be
deportable by immigration judges have a right to appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, a review body created by the Attorney General's regulations. THOMAS
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
257 (4th ed. 1998). Most cases are decided by three-member panels appointed by the
Attorney General. Id. at 257-58.
31. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400 (Michie 2000).
32. Palacios, 1998 BIA LEXIS 44, at *6.
33. 269 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2001).
34. Id. Francis was convicted under a Pennsylvania statute, which stated:
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resident of the United States for over twenty-five years, caused the
deaths of two people in a traffic accident. 5 He was convicted of two
counts of vehicular homicide and "was sentenced to two consecutive
sentences of eighteen to sixty months in prison. 3 6 At the conclusion of
his sentence, the INS initiated deportation proceedings, asserting that
his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony.
The Third Circuit stated that while in some instances a crime that is
categorized as a misdemeanor may be considered an aggravated felony,
this particular statute did not meet the criteria." The court continued to
examine whether, even if this offense could be regarded as a felony, it
qualified as a crime of violence. 9 Answering in the negative, the court
concluded that while the statute under which Francis was convicted may
"'involve[] a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used,'" it "does not, by its nature, requirei .,,40
it."1
The Ninth Circuit was presented with the question of whether
vehicular burglary is a crime of violence.41 Sareang Ye was convicted of
vehicular burglary under a California statute which read: "Every person
who enters any.., vehicle ... when the doors are locked ... with intent
to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary." 
4 2
Because use and attempted or threatened use of force are not elements
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged
in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth ... applying to the operation or
use of a vehicle.., except section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of
alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of
the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (West 1996). Driving "'while his operating privilege was
suspended'" was the attendant circumstance that fulfilled the condition precedent to Francis's
criminal culpability. Francis, 269 F.3d at 172.
35. Francis, 269 F.3d at 164.
36. Id. at 165.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 166-74. The court reiterated its previous conclusion that "'certain
misdemeanants who receive a sentence of one year,' even though the underlying crime has
been labeled a 'misdemeanor' under state law" may qualify as aggravated felons under
federal law. Id. at 167 (quoting United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir. 1999)).
However, while such misdemeanor offenses may be considered felonies under § 16(a), § 16(b)
specifically requires that the offense be a felony under state law. Id. at 168.
39. Id. at 171.
40. Id. at 174 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000)).
41. Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2000).
42. Id. at 1130 n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 1994)).
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of the offense, the court was with the similar question of whether
vehicular burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force would be used in the commission of the offense. 3
As previously discussed, courts generally apply a categorical
approach, looking only to the elements of the offense." However, when
the statute encompasses both conduct that would constitute a crime of
violence and conduct that does not, courts look to the charging papers."5
It was alleged that Ye had "entered a locked vehicle with intent to
commit theft."4'6 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the real
question was whether entry into a locked vehicle with intent to commit
theft is, by its nature, a crime that involves a substantial risk that
physical force will be used. 7 In concluding that Ye had not been
convicted of a crime of violence, the court reasoned that a crime of
violence necessarily entails force that is violent in nature.49 The court
noted that numerous methods may be employed to commit vehicular
burglary without using violent force, such as utilizing a stolen key or
entering through an open window."0
The crimes of rape and sexual abuse of a minor, while specifically
listed as crimes that qualify as aggravated felonies,5 also fall under the
crime of violence provision. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v.
Reyes-Castro,3 considered whether a conviction for attempted sexual
abuse of a minor qualifies as a crime of violence.4 The court noted that
"when an older person attempts to sexually touch a child.., there is
always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the
child's compliance. Sexual abuse of a child is therefore a crime of





48. Id. Contra United States v. Guzman-Landeros, 207 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2000)(holding that vehicular burglary is a crime of violence); United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding the same).
49. Ye, 214 F.3d at 1133 (citing Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 875 n.10 (7th Cir.
2000)).
50. Id.
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2000).
52. See, e.g., Guadarrama v. Perryman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 782, 783-84 (N.D. I11. 1999).




violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).""5 The court further emphasized that
any crime, such as rape, that "involves a non-consensual act upon
another person" is a crime of violence because there is a substantial
likelihood that force will be used to effectuate compliance.56 Under the
categorical approach, it is irrelevant whether force is actually used. 7
Applying the crime of violence statute in the context of the
previously discussed crimes (arson, vehicular homicide, vehicular
burglary, and attempted sexual abuse of a minor) yields a comparative
perspective for considering the classification of drunk driving as a crime
of violence. Given the grave consequences of deportation, it is
important that the punishment fit the crime. Deportation for violent
crimes, such as murder, rape, and similar crimes, is no doubt an
appropriate measure. However, the application becomes less clear
when considering crimes such as drunk driving and vehicular homicide.
It is important to consider that, in at least one federal circuit, a
conviction for vehicular homicide-where the life of another was
taken-will not result in deportation. 8 Yet in other circuits, an alien
may be deported based upon a drunk driving conviction that may or
may not have resulted in the death of another. 9
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: A CRIME OF VIOLENCE?
This section will review the circuit court decisions that have resulted
in the current federal circuit split. A minority of the federal circuits
have concluded that felony DWI does in fact give rise to a deportable
crime of violence. After reviewing these decisions, this section will then
focus on the analyses employed by the circuits that have concluded
drunk driving does not constitute a crime of violence. It is clear that the
issue of whether a crime of violence requires specific intent to use
physical force is at the center of the circuit split.'
55. Id. at 379.
56. Id. Of course, depending on the underlying statute, a conviction for rape may
qualify as a crime of violence under § 16(a). However, not all rape statutes have the use,
attempted, or threatened use of force as an element of the crime. In these cases, the offense
satisfies § 16(b). For instance, rape is defined under Utah's statutes as "'sexual intercourse
with another.., without the victim's consent."' Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1)
(1990)).
57. Id.
58. See Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2001).
59. See infra Part III.A.
60. See Rah, supra note 13, at 2110-11.
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A. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have both ruled that drunk driving
qualifies as an aggravated felony based upon their determination that
the offense constitutes a crime of violence.6 However, the courts did
not base their conclusions on the same provision in the definition of
crime of violence. The Tenth Circuit held that driving under the
influence qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16(b)," while the
Eleventh Circuit determined that the offense constitutes a crime of
violence under § 16(a).63
The Tenth Circuit convicted Jose Tapia-Garcia, a citizen of Mexico
and a legal permanent resident of the United States, of driving under
the influence (DUI) in 1998.64 As a result, the INS instituted
deportation proceedings.65 An immigration judge concluded that the
statutory definition of crime of violence includes DUI offenses, and the
BIA agreed.66 In Tapia-Garcia v. INS,67 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA's determination and held that a DUI
offense constitutes a crime of violence under § 16(b)." Therefore,
according to the Tenth Circuit, a DUI is an aggravated felony and is an
offense that subjects an alien to deportation."
Tapia-Garcia argued that because drunk driving does not involve a
"'substantial risk that physical force... may be used in the course of
committing the offense,'" a DUI offense does not satisfy the statutory
definition of a crime of violence." The Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed
this argument.7 The court concluded that because of the inherent
dangers of driving while intoxicated, the generic elements of the offense
suggest that there would ordinarily be a risk that physical force would be
61. Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2001); Le v. U.S. Attorney
Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
62. Tapia-Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1223.
63. Le, 196 F.3d at 1354.
64. Tapia-Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1217. Tapia-Garcia was sentenced to five years in prison;
however, he only served two months in prison. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1216.
68. Id. at 1223.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1221 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000)).
71. While the court mentioned the language in § 16(b), it failed to undertake a thorough
analysis of what this language entailed. See id. at 1221-23.
20031
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used.7 ' Therefore, assuming the DUI offense could be classified as a
felony, as it was in the instant case,73 the offense would constitute a
crime of violence.74
In Le v. United States Attorney General,7 the Eleventh Circuit also
held that DUI qualified as a crime of violence.76 Duan Le, a citizen of
Vietnam, was convicted of the felony charge of driving under the
influence with serious bodily injury.77 As a result, the court sentenced
Le to thirty-three months of imprisonment. The conviction, which
encompassed a prison term of greater than one year, satisfied the first
requirement for a finding of a deportable "crime of violence. 79
In determining whether DUI qualified as a crime of violence, the
court looked to the elements of the offense. The Florida statute under
which Mr. Le was convicted contained two elements."0 The first element
required that the vehicle be operated by Le while he was intoxicated.
The second element required that his operation of the vehicle resulted
in serious bodily injury to another. 2
Without much elaboration, the court concluded that the operation of
a vehicle resulting in serious bodily injury to another is an element of
the overall offense that includes the actual use of force. Thus, a
conviction for driving under the influence with serious bodily injury
satisfied the definition of crime of violence under § 16(a).' The
government asserted that, even if the aggravating factor of serious
bodily injury was absent, driving under the influence in and of itself
presented a substantial risk that physical force would be used and thus
72. Id. at 1222.
73. Tapia-Garcia was convicted of driving under the influence in violation of section 18-
8004(5) of the Idaho Code. Id. at 1217. Tapia-Garcia was sentenced to five years in prison,
but he only served two months. Id. However, even if the sentence is suspended or the
sentence is not fully served, the one-year imprisonment requirement is satisfied under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). See Marley, supra note 9, at 868-69.
74. Tapia-Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1222.
75. 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
76. Id. at 1354.
77. Id. at 1353. Le was also convicted of a separate felony charge of driving with a
suspended license with serious bodily injury. Id.
78. Id. at 1354.
79. See id.
80. Id. (Le was convicted under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193(3) (West 1996)).
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would be a crime of violence under § 16(b)." The Eleventh Circuit did
not address this issue.86
Based on the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the offense
constitutes a crime of violence under § 16(a), it is likely that the court
would find felony DWI without bodily injury a crime of violence under §
16(b). If the court views the element of bodily injury as a result of the
use of force, it will likely view the risk of that injury as a risk that
physical force may be used within the terms of the statute.
B. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
In Dalton v. Ashcroft," the Second Circuit concluded that DWI is
not a crime of violence, and is therefore not a deportable offense.88
Thomas Dalton, a citizen of Canada who had been a legal permanent
resident of the United States since 1958, was convicted of his third DWI
under New York law in 1998.89 The statute under which Dalton was
convicted stated that "'[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while
in an intoxicated condition.' '" 9 In 1999, while Dalton was serving his
prison sentence, the INS initiated deportation proceedings, arguing that
the DWI offense qualified as a deportable crime of violence. 9' The
immigration judge agreed and ordered that Dalton be removed from the
United States.92 Dalton appealed this decision to the BIA, which
affirmed the immigration judge's decision.93 Dalton then appealed to
the Second Circuit.94
The government conceded that Dalton's DWI conviction did not
satisfy the § 16(a) definition of crime of violence.95 Therefore, the
Second Circuit was only presented with the question of whether the
conviction satisfied § 16(b). The court stated that the language of §
16(b) mandates an analysis that looks only to the "intrinsic nature of the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001).
88. Id. at 108.
89. Id. at 202. Under New York law, the third conviction for driving while intoxicated
within a ten-year period results in a felony DWI. Id. at 205 n.7 (citing N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 1193(c)(ii) (Consol. 1992)).
90. Id. at 205 (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192.3 (Consol. 1992)).




95. Id. at 203 n.5.
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offense," rather than an analysis that focuses on the particular factual
circumstances.96
Looking only to the nature of the offense, the court determined that
there are numerous ways an individual may be convicted under New
York's DWI statute without presenting a substantial "risk that force
may be used. "9 For instance, the court noted that an individual can be
convicted of driving while intoxicated if that person sleeps in the driver's
seat of the car even if the car is not running. Additionally, the vehicle
does not even have to be in an operable condition to convict an
individual of DWI." Given these situations, the court concluded that
drunk driving under New York law does not, by its intrinsic nature,
necessarily present a risk that force may be used."°
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Chapa-Garza,°1
analyzed whether DWI was a crime of violence under § 16(b)." 2
However, the purpose of the court's analysis was to determine criminal
sentencing as opposed to deportation.' 3 The defendants in this case"°'
pleaded guilty to unlawfully being in the United States after receiving a
final order of deportation."5 Prior to receiving their deportation orders,
each of the defendants was convicted of DWI in violation of Texas
law."°a Following the United States Sentencing Guidelines section 2L1.2,
which provides for an increase in sentencing if the defendant was
convicted of an aggravated felony prior to deportation, the defendants
received enhanced sentences. 7 The defendants appealed their sentence
enhancements, arguing that a DWI offense is not a crime of violence
and thus, is not an aggravated felony.'
96. Id. at 204. This approach is generally referred to as the categorical approach. Id.
97. Id. at 205.
98. Id. (citing People v. Marriott, 325 N.Y.S.2d 177 (App. Div. 1971)).
99. Id. (citing People v. David "W", 442 N.Y.S.2d 278 (App. Div. 1981)).
100. See id.
101. 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001).
102. Id. at 924-28.
103. Id.
104. The court consolidated the cases of numerous defendants as each presented the
same issue-whether driving while intoxicated is an aggravated felony under the U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 923.
105. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 923. The defendants were in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326(a). Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 923.
106. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 923.
107. Id. at 923 n.3 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (1997)).
108. See id. at 923.
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This particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that
an "'[a]ggravated felony is defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) without
regard to the date of conviction of the aggravated felony.'" 109 Therefore,
whether a DWI is an aggravated felony depends on whether it is
considered a crime of violence under § 16.110 The Fifth Circuit
considered two interpretations of the language in § 16(b). The
government asserted that § 16(b) should be interpreted in the same
fashion as United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.2(a)(2)."'
Under this interpretation, "any offense that involves ... a conscious
disregard of a substantial risk of injury to others, is a crime of
violence."" 2 Under the alternative interpretation, an offense is a crime
of violence "only when the nature of the offense is such that there is a
substantial likelihood that the perpetrator will intentionally employ
physical force against another's person or property in the commission
thereof. ""
The court rejected the first interpretation, stating that this particular
section of the Sentencing Guidelines contains broader language than §
16(b)."4 The court stated that section 4B1.2(a)(2) requires only that the
offense involve conduct that presents a serious risk of injury to another,
whereas § 16(b) requires "that there be a substantial risk that the
defendant will use physical force against another's person or property in
the course of committing the offense."" 5 Applying this interpretation to
felony DWI, the court stated that intentional force is rarely, if ever, used
to commit the offense and, therefore, it is not a crime of violence under
§ 16(b)."6
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Bazan-Reyes v.
INS,"' holding that drunk driving is not a crime of violence, even when
the conviction is for homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle."' The
109. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1 (1997)).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) enumerates specific crimes that constitute aggravated
felonies. One such provision states that an aggravated felony is a-crime of violence as defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 16. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 923.
111. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 925.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 924.
115. Id. at 925.
116. Id. at 928.
117. 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
118. Id. This case presented one issue: whether state drunk driving convictions are
aggravated felonies for purposes of deportation. Id. at 602. The cases of three aliens were
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court rejected INS's contention that a crime of violence is any felony
that involves a substantial risk that force will be exerted upon another."9
The court reasoned that such an interpretation would effectively make
any felony offense that carries a substantial risk of harm a crime of
violence "because physical harm is nearly always the result of some type
of physical force."' 20  For example, a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter caused by speeding would be a crime of violence,
although few people would consider this a violent offense.1
21
The court opted to interpret § 16(b) as requiring a reckless disregard
for the risk that physical force will be employed intentionally in the
course of committing the offense.' The court stated that this criterion
is not satisfied by such intentional acts as "opening the car door or
pressing the accelerator. " m Rather, the conduct must involve actual
violent force to constitute physical force. 24  The Seventh Circuit
concluded that because intentional force is not used to commit drunk
driving offenses, even those resulting in the death of a third party, such
offenses are not crimes of violence within the meaning of § 16(b).25
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino'6
that a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol causing
bodily injury does not rise to the level of a crime of violence under §
16(b)."v Miguel Trinidad-Aquino pled guilty to illegally reentering the
United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C § 1326, after having been
consolidated because they presented the same issue. Id. In 1999, Jose Bazan-Reyes, a
Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated in violation of
section 9-30-5-3 of the Indiana Code. Id. He was sentenced to three years in prison. Id. at
603. In 1997, Arnaldo Gomez-Vela, also a Mexican citizen, was arrested for DUI. Id. He
was charged with aggravated DUI because he had been previously convicted of drunk driving
two times. Id. "Gomez-Vela pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twenty-six months in
prison." Id. at 603-04. In 1998, Wincenty Maciasowicz pleaded guilty to two counts of
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle in violation of section 940.09 of the Wisconsin
Statutes and was sentenced to five years on the first count and ten years on the second count,
to be served consecutively. Id. at 603. In each case, the INS initiated deportation
proceedings, finding that the offenses were crimes of violence, and as a result, each alien was
deportable as an aggravated felon. Id. at 602-04.
119. See id. at 610.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 612.
123. Id. at 611.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 612.
126. 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 1146.
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previously deported.' At the time, the Sentencing Guidelines provided
that a defendant may receive a sixteen-level increase in sentencing if the
defendant was deported after being convicted for an aggravated
felony. This particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines adopts
the definition of aggravated felony contained in 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43). 13" Therefore, the process used to determine whether an
offense is an aggravated felony in this situation is identical to that used
for deportation. 3'
Trinidad-Aquino was convicted under a California statute that reads
in part:
It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of any
alcoholic beverage.., to drive a vehicle and concurrently do any
act forbidden by law, or neglect any duty imposed by law in
driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes
bodily injury to any person other than the driver. 13
2
The government contended that Trinidad-Aquino's DUI conviction
qualified as a crime of violence, and thus subjected him to the
sentencing enhancement.
33
However, the government conceded that this statute could be
violated through negligent acts, as long as the driver was intoxicated
when the negligent acts were committed.1' Although the Ninth Circuit
had previously held that an offense with a reckless mens rea could
satisfy the § 16(b) definition of crime of violence,'35 the court refused to
extend the definition to include offenses involving negligent conduct.
36
The court reasoned that the "substantial risk that force may be used"
language of § 16(b) requires a volitional act. 37 However, the court did
not go as far as other circuits have in requiring intentional conduct.3
128. Id. at 1142.
129. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (1997)).
130. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2, cmt. n.2 (2002).
131. See Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1142-43.
132. Id. at 1143 (quoting CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153(a) (West 2000)).
133. See id. at 1142.
134. Id. at 1143.
135. Id. at 1144 (citing United States v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a conviction for aggravated assault qualified as a crime of violence)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1145.
138. Id. at 1146.
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C. Other Circuits Hint How They May Decide
While not yet directly deciding the issue, some of the remaining
circuits have hinted how they might decide this issue. For instance, the
Third Circuit, in United States v. Parson,'39 analyzed whether a recklessly
endangering conviction was a crime of violence under the much broader
United States Sentencing Guidelines' 4  The court affirmed the lower
court's decision that the conviction qualified as a crime of violence and
thus subjected the defendant to sentencing enhancement.'' Therefore,
under section 4B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a reckless mens rea is
sufficient to support a finding that an offense is a crime of violence' 2
However, the court noted that the result is different when analyzing
the offense under the narrower definition of crime of violence as
detailed in § 16(b).14' The court stated that, under § 16(b), an offense
with a reckless mens rea would not always qualify as a crime of
violence.'4 More importantly, the Third Circuit specifically noted that
drunk driving offenses would not qualify as crimes of violence. 41
Instead, the court stated that, to qualify as a crime of violence under §
16(b), the offense must present a substantial risk that intentional force
will be used. 46
However, in an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit, in United
States v. Santana-Garcia,'47 held that the definition of crime of violence
encompasses a drunk driving conviction. 8 In 1994, Ismael Santana-
Garcia was at fault in a car accident that resulted in the death of a
man. 49 Santana-Garcia's blood alcohol level was determined to be
.284%, and he was convicted of driving under the influence and
sentenced to six years in prison.50 In 1996, after serving his prison term,
Santana-Garcia was deported. 5' Approximately one month later, he
139. 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992).
140. Id. at 860.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 860-61.




147. No. 98-2234, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7285 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2000).
148. Id. at *8.
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illegally reentered the United States.152 In 1998, Santana-Garcia was
arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence, to which he pled guilty. 153 Again, pursuant to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court enhanced his offense by
sixteen levels, determining that his previous drunk driving conviction
was an aggravated felony."'
Upon appeal, Santana-Garcia argued that his previous conviction
did not rise to the level of a crime of violence and thus was not an
aggravated felony.'55 The Sixth Circuit, in a conclusory fashion,
disagreed and affirmed the district court's holding.'56 The court's
analysis was short at best:
This prior conviction is both "an offense that has [as] an element
the use... of physical force against the person or property of
another," see 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and "an offense that is a felony
and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense," see 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)"'
The court continued by citing other cases, both within and outside of
the Sixth Circuit, which found DUI and involuntary manslaughter
offenses to be crimes of violence within the meaning of § 16. '58
However, the court failed to execute its own thorough analysis.
Additiohally, as discussed in Part II, the Ninth Circuit in Park held
that a reckless state of mind is sufficient to find an offender guilty of
committing a crime of violence.59 However, the Santana-Garcia court
reconciled this decision with its holding in Trinidad-Aquino,6' which
held that while a reckless state of mind satisfies the definitional
requirement of crime of violence, a purely negligent mens rea would not
sustain the finding of a crime of violence.1 61 Instead, the court noted that
152. Id.
153. Id. at *2-3.
154. Id. at *3.
155. Id. at *5-6.
156. Id. at *9-10.
157. Id. at *7.
158. See id. at *7-8.
159. Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
160. United States v. Trinidad-Aquino 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); see also supra notes
126-38 and accompanying text.
161. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1145.
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in order to sustain a finding of a crime of violence, there must be, at a
minimum, "a volitional act equivalent to recklessness." 62 However, the
court was careful to point out the distinction between an intentional act
and a volitional act. 63 The court reiterated its position that in order to
find an offense within the definition of crime of violence, the offense
need not be committed with specific intent. A mere reckless state of
mind will suffice."' However, because the particular offense that
Trinidad-Aquino was convicted of required merely a negligent state of
mind, the offense did not fall within the definition of a crime of
violence.'66 Until the Trinidad-Aquino case was released, many in the
legal community assumed that because of the holding in Kyung Park,
the Ninth Circuit would hold that drunk driving was indeed a crime of
violence.67
IV. ANALYSIS: DRUNK DRIVING-A CRIME OF VIOLENCE?
While the majority of the circuits have held that drunk driving
convictions, or other offenses with a negligent or reckless mens rea, are
not crimes of violence, a minority of the circuits have held otherwise.
Given the severity of deportation as a punitive measure, this issue must
be examined carefully.
Additionally, and for the same reason, uniformity should exist
throughout the circuits. An individual living in the Tenth Circuit's
jurisdiction could be deported for an offense that would not subject an
individual living within the Seventh Circuit's jurisdiction to deportation.
This discrepancy alone is sufficient to support an examination by the
Supreme Court. In the event that the Court is presented with this issue,
it should follow the better-reasoned argument that a drunk driving
conviction is not a crime of violence within the meaning of § 16.
A. Statutory Construction: The Meaning of "Use"
The canons of statutory construction require courts to give the
language used in a particular statute its plain and ordinary meaning.66





167. Mason, supra note 16, at 1.
168. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992).
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A departure from this general rule is only appropriate where "there is
any solid indication in the text or structure of the statute that something
other than ordinary meaning was intended."'69
In construing § 16, the courts have generally undertaken an analysis
of the word "use.' 170 Black's Law Dictionary defines "use" in part as:
"To make use of... to employ.., to utilize; to carry out a purpose or
action by means of.' 17' Arguing that the word "use" encompasses
negligent conduct blatantly contradicts the word's ordinary and
accepted meaning. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, "[i]n ordinary,
contemporary, and common parlance, the 'use' of something requires a
volitional act."172 , [A] drunk driving accident is not the result of plan,
direction, or purpose but of recklessness at worst and misfortune at best.
A drunk driver who injures a pedestrian would not describe the incident
by saying he 'used' his car to hurt someone. ,173
Furthermore, in order for an offense to qualify as a crime of violence
under § 16(b), it is not sufficient that there be a substantial risk that
physical force will be used; rather, there must be a substantial risk that
the physical force will be used against the person or property of
another .7 4 Therefore, in order for a drunk driving conviction to satisfy
the definition, the volitional act must refer to the actual or potential
impact or collision.7 5 It is not sufficient to deem as volitional conduct
the act of starting the car or other such conduct that is a condition
precedent to the risk of harm or to actual harm. If the acts of starting
the engine of a car or placing a foot on the gas pedal were alone
sufficient to satisfy the volitional conduct requirement, then every
felony violation of the law with respect to automobiles would qualify as
a crime of violence. The Second Circuit most clearly articulated the
169. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1145.
171. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990)).
172. Id. But see Rah, supra note 13, at 2138-39 (arguing that "use" encompasses non-
intentional conduct). One individual has argued that the passive language "may be used"
indicates that the legislature did not intend § 16(b) to require specific intent. See id. This
argument is unpersuasive, however, as the language merely indicates that it is irrelevant
whether or not force is actually used. The offense, by its nature, must simply present a risk
that force may be used.
173. United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1995).
174. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1145.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200,206 (2d Cir. 2001).
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inherent flaw in holding § 16(b) to include drunk driving offenses,
stating:
[W]e believe the language of § 16(b) fails to capture the nature of
the risk inherent in drunk driving. This risk is, notoriously, the
risk on an ensuing accident; it is not the risk that the driver will
"use physical force" in the course of driving the vehicle. Indeed,
in the context of driving a vehicle, it is unclear what constitutes
the "use of physical force." The physical force used cannot
reasonably be interpreted as a foot on the accelerator or a hand
on the steering wheel. Otherwise, all driving would, by
definition, involve the use of force, and it is hard to believe that
Congress intended for all felonies that involve driving to be
"crimes of violence. "7
Both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that even offenses
containing merely a negligent mens rea, such as some drunk driving
statutes, can be crimes of violence under § 16, but neither of these courts
undertook an analysis of whether the statutory language of the word use
requires a volitional act. 79 In fact, every circuit that has employed such
an analysis has concluded that use requires volitional conduct, either
reckless or intentional in nature.' 80
B. Insight from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
An examination of the Career Offender Guideline, section 4B1.2 of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, may provide some insight into
whether drunk driving is a crime of violence for purposes of
deportation. The Guidelines provide that a crime of violence is:
[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
178. Id.
179. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146. Neither Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216
(10th Cir. 2001), nor Le v. United States, 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999), analyzed whether the
statutory language of "use" requires volitional conduct.
180. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146.
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explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.'
At first glance, this definition of crime of violence appears to be very
similar to the definition under § 16(b)."' However, upon closer
examination, there are marked differences between the second prongs
of each definition.' The definition contained in the Sentencing
Guidelines is much broader" and merely "requires that the offense
involve conduct that poses a serious risk of physical injury to another
person."'8 5 Section 4B1.2(a)(2) is concerned only with the effect of
particular conduct.8 6 However, § 16(b) is centered on the conduct itself,
without regard to whether there is a substantial risk of injury to
another's person or property.'87 Section 16(b) is much narrower,
requiring that there be a substantial risk that physical force will be used
against another's person or property in the course of committing the
offense.' 8
The Tenth Circuit, in finding DWI a crime of violence under § 16,
focused only on the potential effect of driving under the influence. 9
The court concluded that DWI is a crime of violence because of the
potential serious risk of injury to others.'90 Apparently, the court
decided that because physical harm is almost always the result of the use
of physical force, conduct that presents serious risk of harm to another is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of § 16(b).'9'
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit, in holding that the offense of DUI
with resulting bodily injury is a crime of violence under § 16(a), focused
on the effect of the offense rather than on the conduct itself."" The two
elements of the offense, intoxicated operation of a vehicle and resulting
181. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2001).
182. See, e.g., Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2001).
183. See id.
184. Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 610 (7th Cir. 2001).
185. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 925 (5th Cir. 2001).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. See Gonzalo Palacios-Palacios, No. A90-284-849, 1998 BIA LEXIS 44 (Dec.
18, 1998), 22 1. & N. Dec. 434 (B.I.A. 1998) for a discussion of the difference between the risk
of physical injury to another and a substantial risk that force will be used.
189. See Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See Le v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 193 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
2003]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
serious bodily injury, cannot be said to include the use of force as an
element. While not decided by the Eleventh Circuit, it is quite apparent
from the opinion in Le that the court would conclude that a DUI
conviction, without the element of bodily injury, would nevertheless
constitute a crime of violence under § 16(b).9 '
It appears that the Tenth Circuit has interpreted, and the Eleventh
Circuit would interpret, § 16(b) in the same fashion that section 4B1.2 is
interpreted. However, not only does the different language suggest that
§ 16(b) and section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines cover different offenses, but
the legislative history of section 4B1.2 also counsels against such an
interpretation.9 '  Guideline 4B1.2(a) originally incorporated the
definition of a crime of violence into § 16(b).'95 On November 1, 1989,
this reference was eliminated and the current definition that appears in
the statute became effective.'96 The mere fact that the definition was
revised conclusively demonstrates that the two statutes cover different
types of conduct.
Moreover, Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to
ensure that criminals convicted of certain offenses, including crimes of
violence as defined by § 16(b), receive near-maximum sentences.'" The
legislative history also suggests that Congress left room for the
Commission to expand the type and number of offenses that are subject
to the Career Offender Guideline.'98 The Senate Report stated that its
directive was "'not necessarily intended to be an exhaustive list of types
of cases in which the guidelines should specify a substantial term of
imprisonment.'"''  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the
Commission intended the revised definition to encompass a broader
range of conduct-conduct that merely presents a serious potential risk
of injury to another."°
C. Construing Ambiguities in Favor of the Alien
The Supreme Court has a longstanding principle of construing
193. See supra Part III.A.
194. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 926.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866-67 (3d Cir. 1992).
198. Id. at 867.
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ambiguous deportation statutes in favor of the alien. 1 Such deference
is granted because the punitive nature of deportation is so severe."2 The
Court has explained its rationale, stating that "since the stakes are
considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant
to trench on [an alien's] freedom beyond that which is required by the
narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used."2"3 Therefore,
assuming arguendo that the language of § 16(b) is ambiguous, the courts
should assign "use" its narrowest possible meaning.
Besides the punitive nature of deportation, the justification for
construing deportation statutes in favor of the alien should be based on
one of our nation's immigration policies-to keep families together'
4
As of 1996, over 11.7 million permanent legal residents had not been
naturalized,"5 leaving them vulnerable to deportation. Many aliens have
been residents of the United States for decades when the government
initiates deportation proceedings against them.0 6  After years as
permanent United States residents, these individuals have developed
strong ties. They have families, friends, and jobs. Deportation may
result in the loss of a family's breadwinner or the loss of a mother or
father. 7 When the government initiates deportation proceedings for
offenses such as drunk driving, we must ask ourselves whether we are
really solving a problem or just creating a new one.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that drunk driving is a serious and dangerous
offense. In the year 2000 alone, over 16,000 people died in alcohol-
related traffic accidents." 8 Estimates indicate that every thirty-two
201. E.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502, U.S. 478,487 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); INS v.
Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
202. Errico, 385 U.S. at 225 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
203. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10.
204. Morawetz, supra note 4, at 1950. Morawetz also provides a discussion of the impact
that the 1996 deportation laws have on families. Id. at 1950-54.
205. Dick Kirschten, American Dreamers, 29 NAT'L J. 1364, 1364 (1997). Out of 19.9
million legal permanent residents, only 8.2 million had been naturalized as of 1996. Id.
206. See George M. Anderson, New Tides of Immigration; Immigrants and Labor
Unions, AMERICA, July 1, 2000, at 12.
207. Morawetz, supra note 4, at 1951-53. For a discussion on the impact of deportation
on families, see id. at 1950-54.
208. Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics & Insurance Issues, at http://www.iii.
org/media/hottopics/insurance/drunk/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
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minutes there is an alcohol-related fatality. However, courts should
not interpret § 16(b) to encompass DWI offenses solely because of these
figures. Simply put, the statute enacted by Congress does not include
drunk-driving offenses. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits' analyses, or
lack thereof, suggest that its judicial decision-making processes were
tainted by personal views on drunk driving. A thorough, legal analysis
based on statutory construction, legislative history, and social policy
results in the conclusion that § 16(b) requires that the statute under
which an individual is convicted encompass, at a minimum, reckless
conduct, but ideally specific intent.
Courts should not make legal determinations in a conclusory
fashion, especially when dealing with the severe consequence of
deportation. A thorough, legal analysis is required to ensure that the
law is fairly and properly enforced. As stated by the Second Circuit,
drunk driving is "an urgent, nationwide problem of staggering
proportion. But by shoehorning such reprehensible conduct into
criminal statutes that were not designed to hold it, we risk an equivalent
harm of usurping federal and state legislative roles."20
Congress, of course, has the authority to specifically enumerate
drunk driving as a deportable offense. However, such a decision would
inflict a punishment disproportionate to the crime. Consider for a
moment that in 1999, the number of individuals arrested for drunk
driving was nearly 1.5 million.2" That works out to approximately one
arrest in every 121 drivers in the United States." Of those,
approximately one-third are repeat offenders (generally one must be a
repeat offender to be convicted of a DWI felony). 3 These repeat
offenders often do not face more than one year of imprisonment. 4 Yet,
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits seek to punish these individuals with
one of the most severe forms of punishment-deportation.
Our treatment of citizens should serve as a point of reference for
determining how to treat non-citizens convicted of the same crimes.
This is not to say that citizens and non-citizens should necessarily be
treated in the exact same fashion, but such a disparity in treatment may
209. Id.
210. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200,208 (2d Cir. 2001).
211. Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics & Insurance Issues, at http://www.iii.
org/mediahottopics/insurance/drunk/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 346.65 (2001-2002).
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be indicative of an over-reaching statute. Congress did not intend such
offenses to be included in § 16"5 nor should Congress amend the statute
to encompass drunk driving as a deportable offense. 6
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